Cleavages and political party system in Israel: applying Lipset and Rokkan’s model to a non-Western case

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Introduction

Since the publication of Lipset and Rokkan’ work, *Party systems and Voter Alignments*¹, their analysis of the emergence and crystallisation of cleavages in Western European states has been often used, much discussed, sometimes criticised and altered. This dynamic has, contributed on the one hand, to the better understanding of Western European political systems and voting structures. On the other hand, it has led other scholars to try and apply Lipset and Rokkan’s theoretical framework to non-Western European states, showing the usefulness of this model for understanding the “origins and ‘freezing’ of [the] party system […], and the […] alignments of voters” in states that were not taken into account in the initial work². Indeed, in spite of the West European centred character of the original study, the analytical steps of the cleavages’ formation identified by the authors and later summarised by Bartolini can be used in order to analyse long-term process of cleavage formation in any states.

This article aims at fitting into and contributing to the latter studies by attempting to apply Lipset and Rokkan’s model to a non-Western European case: Israel. The choice

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² The application of this approach to non-Western states has in fact been successfully implemented in the case of the Central and Eastern Europe states. See Jean-Michel De Waele, 2004, *Les clivages politiques en Europe centrale et orientale*, Bruxelles, Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2004

* I would like to thank Paul Magnette and Jean-Benoît Pilet for their helpful comments and advice.
of the Israeli case comes from two observations. On the one hand, the frequent depiction of the Israeli political system as extremely heterogeneous, fragmented and hence very unstable. On the other, the fact that despite the very frequent use of the “cleavage” concept in Israeli studies and the several Israel cleavages’ typologies that have been offered, none of these studies have used the analytical framework of Lipset and Rokkan, hence leading to important conceptual stretching of the original notion.

In this perspective, this paper seeks to give a new interpretation and typology of Israeli cleavages by coming back to the work of the Lipset and Rokkan. It is beyond the scope of this article to cover all the aspects that are present in their work. Rather, what is at stake here is to explain the emergence of conflicts, to identify the conditions for the development and crystallisation of cleavages and to question the validity of the freezing of political alternatives hypothesis in Israel.

1. Identifying the Israeli revolution and critical junctures

In their work, Lipset and Rokkan identified the emergence, crystallisation and political translation of four cleavages resulting from what they called “revolutions”. On the one hand, they pointed out a “functional” opposition between the “centralising, [...] nation-state and the historically established corporate privileges of the Church” and a “territorial” conflict between the national-building elite –the centre– and cultural

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5 Lipset, Seymour M., Rokkan, Stein, op.cit.

6 The term “cleavage” has been used in different ways in the Israeli literature, depending on the study, sometimes referring to a political division –“political cleavage”– sometimes to variables affecting political attitudes and voting behaviours but most often to social structurations and/or social divisions –“social cleavages”.

peripheral minorities (geographically, economically or symbolically), both the outcome of the national revolution\(^8\). On the other hand, they highlighted a territorial conflict opposing the landed interests to the industrial entrepreneurs as well as a functional conflict between the owners and the labourers that were generated by the industrial revolution. These cleavages have thus emerged due to long-term processes where Bartolini has identified different general steps: -a generation of oppositions due to differences of interest/ideology generated by macro-process of modernisation (1); crystallisation of opposition lines into conflicts over public policy (2) ; emergence of alliances of political entrepreneurs engaged in mobilising support for one set of policies (3); choice of mobilisation strategy (reliance on pre-established networks or new organisations) (4); choice of the arena for the confrontation of mobilised resources (aggregation of votes for electoral contests or direct action) (5)\(^9\). Each state’s specific dynamics have brought about different cleavages and specific political alternatives, which according to Lipset and Rokkan’s theory, froze with the 1920s critical juncture, i.e. just before the extension of the suffrage\(^10\). These main political structures are assumed to have remained unaltered and are expected to stay unchanged unless a new revolution occurs\(^11\).

In order to analyse the process of emergence and crystallisation of Israeli cleavages, it thus seems necessary to first identify the revolution and critical junctures that played a role in the Israeli political mobilisation and system. First, it appears that in contrast to the European experience, the state of Israel was built long after the industrial revolution took place and the conflicts related to it had emerged. Hence, the majority of the Zionists who immigrated to Palestine already had clear-cut positions on related issues, which were thus not the result of a process specific to Israel. In this perspective, though the industrial revolution had an influence on Israeli political ideas, it is the national revolution that led to the specificities of the Israeli political conflicts and cleavages and it is thus the one that must be taken into account in our analysis.

\(^9\) Bartolini, Stefano, 2000, *op.cit.*, p.13
The Israeli national revolution also deviates from the formation process of European states: the Jewish national project first developed outside the future national territory. Thus, political streams developed first in Europe and in the United States, where the majority of the Zionist leaders and institutions were located, before any Zionist institutions were set up in Palestine. Consequently, in contrast to most European countries where political parties have emerged from conflicts over interests generated by long-term processes, parties already existed in Israel before the “crystallisation of opposition lines into conflicts over public policy” It is thus necessary to go back to the pre-state era and the Zionist movement to understand the cleavages’ formation. Finally, the Israeli state’s history has been marked by wars and territorial changes that also influenced the political processes.

It thus appears that three junctures and phases must be distinguished when we want to analyse the impact of the national revolution on the Israeli cleavage formation process and their translation in the political system: First, the pre-state phase, which started with the first waves of Zionist immigrations in Palestine under mandate and where “a generation of oppositions due to differences of interest/ideology emerged” (step 1). Second, a phase starting in 1948 with the formation of the state and the citizenry integration into the system, and which is when cleavages crystallised (step 2 to 5). Finally, the six-day appears as a critical juncture, opening a phase of socio-political realignment and stabilisation, corresponding to what occurred in Europe in the 1920s. The phases must be analysed separately to understand the socio-historical processes leading to the current political party system.

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12 At the time, the Ottoman Empire ruled territory of Palestine was inhabited by Arab populations, Ottoman administers and by only a small unorganised Jewish minority, the “old Yishuv”.
13 The World Zionist Organisation created in 1897 had its executive in London, and the headquarters of its fundraising institutions, Keren Kayemet and the Keren Hayessod moved to Palestine in the 1920s while the Palestine based Zionist institutions were set up only under the British mandate after the First World War. Sandler, Shmul, “Territoriality and nation-state formation: the Yishuv and the making of the state of Israel”, Nations and Nationalism, 1997, 3 (4), p.676
14 Bartolini, Stefano, op.cit, p.13.
1. The pre-state phase: the emergence of the first division lines

Most of Israeli cleavages take their roots in the pre-state era, during the British mandate - 1922-1948 - and more specifically after the Jewish community in Palestine - the Yishuv - was granted autonomy to serve the needs of its population. During that period, the population was composed of a variety of groups, between which some disputes and divisions emerged. It is necessary to analyse the conditions of these division lines’ emergence to understand the crystallisation of cleavages during the second phase.

The Anti-Zionist vs. Zionist conflict

The deepest and most violent clash certainly was that, which separated the Zionist movement on the one hand, and those resisting the Jewish national project in Palestine on the other.

The first opposition to Zionism emerged from Jewish ultra-orthodox groups for whom the formation of a Jewish realm through human action rather than by the will of God was seen as a heresy. In 1912, they created a worldwide movement the Agudat Israel-, which aimed at combating Zionism. In Palestine, they however adopted a non-linear attitude to the Zionists. After having boycotted all the elections of the Yishuv assembly –the Knesset Israel- and broken away from the Yishuv in 1928, their position progressively changed for two reasons. On the one hand, because of growing anti-Semitism in Europe and on the other, in order to guarantee the protection of their rights in the state to be, when it became clear that the Zionist project would succeed. Hence, soon before the formation of the State of Israel, their political movement collaborated with the Zionist institutions. As a result, they negotiated an agreement known as the “status quo” providing them guarantees over the respect of religious norms in the future state in

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16 At this occasion, they asked for an autonomous status, which was however denied by the British administration. Smooha, Sammy,1978, *op.cit.*, p.64
exchange to their recognition of the state. By signing this agreement, the ultra-orthodox segment thus accepted to recognise and to enter into the Zionist system.

The second group that opposed to Zionist movement was composed of Palestinian Arabs. Before the 1920s, relations between Arabs and Jewish immigrants were very similar to the *millet* system introduced by the Ottomans: they lived in an autonomous fashion without major interactions. However, the British mandate’s official support of the Jewish “national home”, the demographic shift between Arabs and Jews in the 1920s and the refusal by the British to give the Arabs an autonomous status led to mobilisation, sometimes violent, in order to oppose the Zionist project. Hence, in the 1920s, a series of riots erupted against the Jews, followed by Arab revolts in the end of the 1930s against the Jewish and the British presence, which reached their apex after the UN partition plan of 1947 was drafted.

Finally, the communists constituted another strong opponent of Zionism. The communist segment did not represent an important part of the population of Palestine: besides a small Arab communist party, most of the communists were Jewish immigrants who had first adhered to the Zionist ideal and then opposed it. The reason for such a move was mainly the way Arab inhabitants were treated, perceived and integrated into the Zionist project, which according to the far left reflected a “bourgeois”, “imperialistic” and “colonialist” attitude. The common positions of Arab and Jewish communists on major issues as the legitimacy of the Zionist project allowed the creation of a single communist party in 1922, the Arab-Jewish Palestinian Communist Party promoting a bi-national independent state.

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18 The agreement entailed provisions related to the imposition of Jewish norms on the public sphere, the regulation of personal status by religious law and recognition of all trends of education. A fraction of the ultra-orthodox groups (among which the sect Neturei Karta) never operated such a move: it kept on objecting to the Zionist goal and refused to recognise the State of Israel in 1948.
19 Smooha, Sammy, 1978, *op.cit.*, p. 66
20 The Jewish immigration shifted the Jewish-Arab proportion from 78% of Arabs and 11% of Jews in 1922 to 63% and 28% respectively in 1936. Kimmerling, Baruch, 1983, *op.cit.*
Division lines amongst Zionist groups

Within the Zionist movement, the coexistence of different political trends and groups of populations was reflected and favoured by the proportional electoral system chosen for the elections of the Knesset Israel.

The dominant political stream within the pre-state institutions was the labour movement and more specifically the workers’ party – the Mapai. The main ideological pattern of the latter was “socialist-constructivist”: it promoted a nation-building model meant to free both the Jews and the working class from their domination that were best translated into the establishment of collective agricultural communities that combined socialism and settling of the land. The dominant position of the movement can be explained by several factors. First, by its important role as immigration channel. Secondly, because of its strong organisations, amongst which the Histadrut (the Labour Federation of Jews in Palestine), that provided essential services to the new immigrants. Finally, because it was a major actor in the defence forces’ formation, which later came under the control of the Histadrut.

The second force within the Zionist sphere was the religious Zionist group. In contrast to the ultra-orthodox segment, it was not opposed to the Zionist project that it saw as a tool for achieving religious and biblical goals but challenged the secular aspect of the project presented by the dominant Zionist forces. Still, their basic agreement with the Zionist project made them opt for full integration into the Zionist institutions. In 1902, they created a political party - the Mizrachi- that was represented in the Zionist institutions, and their working forces were integrated in the Histadrut as well as in the defence forces. During this period, the main issues of contention with the secular parties were related to allocation of resources necessary for the funding of institutions like

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25 Although it was officially not dependent on any party (every party was represented in the organisation), the Histadrut was created by Ben Gurion and its leaders essentially came from the Labour political movement.
schools and cultural organisations, and despite the deep divergences between religious and secular on the place of religion, no important conflict emerged at the time.\(^{28}\)

The third political stream represented in the pre-state Zionist institutions was the liberal bourgeois movement, mainly represented by the General Zionists. The latter party was created in 1922 by various non-aligned groups, initially as a non-ideological neutral party. In spite of its proclaimed neutrality, its socio-economic values were however mostly liberal, championing the encouragement of private initiative, individualism and protection of middle-class rights. Its electoral support came mostly from liberal or less politicised urban populations (mainly arrived in 1924 and 1929). However, the lack of unity -which ultimately led to a split between the General Zionist and the Progressive Party\(^{29}\) - as well as its weak institutionalisation did not allow it to gain strong support in the Zionist institutions\(^{30}\).

The fourth major political force was the Revisionist movement of Jabotinsky created in 1925. Like the General Zionists, its social basis was mainly composed of urban bourgeois and its platform was liberal-oriented\(^{31}\). The main issue of conflict was however related to conception of nationalism and opposed the Revisionist to the labour movement. While the latter envisaged state building in a quite civic and pragmatic way, the Revisionists carried an ethno-nationalist conception of the Zionist project and advocated territorial maximalism. Moreover, while the Labour movement believed for the major part in the possibility of a compromise with the Palestinian Arab population, Jabotinsky’s supporters saw the conflict as inevitable and promoted the preventive use of force\(^{32}\). Tensions between both movements soon emerged eventually leading the Revisionists to leave the main Zionist institutions. In the 1930s, they left the Histadrut and created their own trade union in parallel to the former and in 1935, after their program was rejected by the World Zionist Organisation, they formed their own Zionist organisation, the “New

\(^{29}\) Bensoussan, Georges, *op.cit.*, p.378  
\(^{31}\) Bensoussan, Georges, *op.cit.*, p.376  
Zionist Organisation”. Finally, in the 1930s, they left the Yishuv defence forces to join an underground organisation that operated until 1948, after violent clashes with Mapai.

The last political movement aimed at representing the Oriental populations of Palestine, which reached an overall representation of 25% after the first elections. However, the lack of autonomous Oriental institutions, the “fusions of the exile” Zionist leitmotiv and the lack of financial support from the Diaspora rapidly led to a diminution of its presence in the political arena.

It is thus possible at this point, to identify four major –institutionalised- lines of division during the pre-state phase (see Table 1): a division between Zionist and anti-Zionist, a religious vs. secular dispute, a labourer vs. bourgeois opposition and a socialist constructivist vs. ethno-nationalist conflict.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lines of division</th>
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<th>Political force</th>
<th>Social stratification</th>
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<td>Anti-Zionist vs. Zionist</td>
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<td>- Communist</td>
<td>- Communists</td>
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<td>- Palestinian Arabs</td>
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<td>Religious vs. Secular</td>
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<td>Free market vs. Socialism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constructivism</td>
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<td>- Labour parties</td>
<td>- “Pioneers”</td>
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</tbody>
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33 Bensoussan, Georges, op.cit., p.378
34 The Altalena affair can be considered as the apex of the conflict between the Labour and the Revisionists. Following the independence of the state of Israel and the creation of the Israel Defence Forces, all other military organisations were pressed to adhere to the new army. The IZL which had integrated the new army demanded that the arms from the Altalena ship they had organised to come be given to their battalions. The rejection of this demand led to violent conflicts ending in the sinking of the Altalena boat by the IDF, p.222.
2. The impact of the state formation: crystallisation of cleavages

The formation of the state of Israel in 1948 can be seen as a critical juncture in the formation and crystallisation of cleavages in Israel. If, during the first phase political and ideological divisions had emerged due to the pre-state socio-historical configurations, the independence of the Zionist state created the conditions for the crystallisation of some of the existing division lines and their transformation into cleavages.

After 1948, the leading party within the pre-state Zionist institutions, the Mapai, turned out to be the dominant political party both in social and political life. The labour party indeed monopolised political, economic and symbolic resources during the first 30 years of the state. Despite its predominant position, the quasi-integral proportional electoral system did not give the party the opportunity to get an absolute majority alone, its best score during the 30 first years of the state reaching 38.2% of the vote (in 1959). Hence, the centre party Mapai was never able to rule without forming a coalition government. These institutional constraints allowed the other segments to take different stances toward the centre: a total opposition and exit from the political system (which was the case of a small ultra-orthodox group); an opposition to the system from within; loyalty to the system and competition for power and influence. The positioning regarding the centre (see table 2) and the relationship established with it during that period led to specific modus of conflict that can be seen as the major explanatory element in the cleavages crystallisation process.

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37 Kimmerling, Baruch, *op. cit.*
38 Knesset website, elections results.
The crystallisation of the Zionist vs. anti-Zionist division: the centre vs. periphery cleavage

The major outcome of this Israeli independence was indeed the incorporation of anti-Zionists segments into the new state they had long opposed. The relations established between the centre and those peripheral groups -in both political and symbolical terms- during that period, led to the crystallisation of a centre vs. periphery cleavage, which is still present in the political spectrum today.

As mentioned above, the first anti-Zionist group, the ultra-orthodox segment had chosen for a position within the Zionist political system by collaborating with the centre.

The representative of communist groups also opted for entering the system, but as an opposition party. Hence, it took part in the electoral competitions, was represented in the Knesset but was excluded from the sphere of decision-making because of its anti-Zionist and thus an-system discourse. During the first years, the communist anti-Zionist party was the main voice of the peripheral groups.

The Arab populations\(^{39}\) had a more complex position and relationship to the political centre, which has been interpreted as an “exclusionary domination model”\(^{40}\). On the one hand, their place in society was clearly peripheral. First, they were excluded from

\(^{39}\) That represented approximately 186 000, or 10% of the population. Smooha, Sammy, “The model of ethnic democracy: Israel as a Jewish and democratic state”, Nations and Nationalism, 2002, 8 (4), p484.

political and symbolical power because of Israel’s definition as a Jewish state, which *de facto* excluded them from the national community and collective goals.\(^{41}\) Second, the perception of Arabs as a potential enemy had at least two consequences in terms of status and integration: during the first two decades of the state, Arab regions were under military administration, severely restricting their freedoms and their power to create political associations.\(^{42}\) Moreover, they were left out from most of the important institutions of the country and from the major channel of social integration, namely the army.\(^{43}\) On the other hand, Arab citizens were pressed to adhere to the new state and to prove loyalty to the centre’s institutions.\(^{44}\) A good illustration of this model was the system of the “minorities’ lists” which were Arab lists running in the elections under the tutelage of a Zionist party—in most cases the Mapai.\(^{45}\)

The Arab minority’s political alternative was thus either to vote in favour of the centre’s lists (a Labour list or a minorities’ list) or to vote in favour of the anti-system communist party expressing their peripheral stance. While in the first years, most of the Arab population gave its voice to the minorities’ lists,\(^{46}\) the support given to the communist party increased, especially after 1961.\(^{47}\) The growing anti-system vote expressed by the Arabs can be seen as evidence of the failure of the “exclusionary-domination model” to lessen the original line of division between Jews and Arabs. At the same time, electoral success of the communist party progressively became dependent on the Arab vote, confirming the strong interrelation between communists and the Arab population.\(^{48}\)


\(^{42}\) The Oum el Fahm and the Taybee regions were put under the Emergency (Security Zones) regulations, which allowed the army to close and rule the area. On the military administration, see Hofnung, Menachem, *Democracy, Law and National Security in Israel*, Dartmouth: Aldershot, 1996, p.87.


\(^{47}\) Diskin, Avraham, *op.cit.*, p. 91.

\(^{48}\) In 1965, it split into two factions: one Jewish and the other predominantly Arabic. While the Arab list kept on gaining support, the Jewish faction almost instantly vanished from the political arena. *Ibid.*
Despite the absence of a specifically Arab mobilisation due to the centre’s attempts to control the Arab population and the limited expression of the peripheral voice—expressed by the communists—during that period, the relations between the Zionist centre and the anti-Zionist periphery framed at the time led to the crystallisation of a centre vs. periphery cleavage mainly corresponding to an Arab vs. Jews cleavage, which would only be fully expressed during the third phase.

The religious vs. secular conflict: accommodation system and cleavage crystallisation

The second opposition that crystallised into a cleavage was the religious vs. secular one. As in the case of the centre vs. periphery cleavage, the relations established between the religious segment and the centre during the second phase explain the crystallisation of the cleavage.

During that period, the Zionist religious party became the third political force.49 Because Mapai was opposed to any alliance with the Revisionists and the communists, the Zionist religious party became the first governmental partner of Mapai during the first two decades of the state. The ultra-orthodox segment had a different position toward the centre. It took part in the first and second elections but renounced to take part in any Mapai-led coalition after 1952 due to disagreements on religious issues.50 Nonetheless, the ultra-orthodox party cooperated with the government from without in order to obtain public financial support and other specific rights for the ultra-orthodox segment.51

The support given to the government - either from within or from without - allowed the religious segment to negotiate religious issues with the centre party in an accommodation fashion.52 The first consequence of this situation has been the religious stamp in the process of institutional building: the use of religious law for “personal

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49 With an average electoral support of 10%, just after either the Herut or the General Zionists. See Knesset website, elections results.
50 Luebbert, G.M., *op.cit.*, p.126
52 On the question of the accommodation model, see Don Yehia, Eliezer, *op.cit.*, pp.85-108.
matters”, the preservation of the autonomy of two religious school systems\textsuperscript{53}, the exemption from military service for religious schools students, the assertion of the \textit{status quo} in every governmental agreement etc. The second outcome of these relations was the reinforcement of the religious vs. secular cleavage. Although the consociative mechanisms led to a “moderate and pragmatic position concerning religion from both sides”\textsuperscript{54}, the cooperation between the centre and the religious parties during that period did not diminish the religious vs. secular division. Indeed, unlike the European religious cleavage, the recognition of an autonomous education system -although crucial in the peaceful coexistence of religion and secularism- has not been able to erase the oppositions between both groups on many other issues that have not been resolved amongst which the separation between church and state and the question of who can be considered as a Jew. Moreover, the accommodation system led to the recognition and deepening of the pillarisation of both religious groups, with the recognition of a state religious system, an independent ultra-orthodox school network, autonomous organisations, separate court systems etc.\textsuperscript{55}, which clearly reinforced the social closure of the religious segment toward the secular one. However, this pillarisation process and the very different origins of both religious groups regarding the Zionist project also impeded the amalgamation of both political groups into a single party.

\textit{The crystallisation of the left vs. right cleavage: a Weltanschaung cleavage}

The last and most important cleavage that crystallised during the second phase is a \textit{Weltanschaung} left vs. right cleavage. In contrast to what took place in most European states, the Israeli left vs. right cleavage does not overlap the owner vs. worker line of division (see below) and is rather characterised by a symbolic and cultural conflict than by a functional one.

\textsuperscript{53} While the \textit{Law of State Education 1953}, put an end to the political education systems (socialist and liberal), it allowed the religious education systems to remain. \textit{Ibid.}, p.89.
\textsuperscript{54} Hazan, Reuven, “Religion and Politics in Israel: the Rise and Fall of the consociational model” in Hazan, Reuven, Maor, Moshe (eds.), 2000, \textit{op.cit.}, p.113.
\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Ibid.}, p.119-120.
As already mentioned, the state institutions framed after 1948 were intrinsically linked to the labour pioneer movement and to its ethos. Hence, the labour movements’ members had acquired the highest functions of the state apparatus as well as symbolic power\textsuperscript{56}. In contrast, the secular groups that had not been involved in the labour pioneer enterprise were merely integrated in the political institution-formation process. The non-pioneer segment was composed of a variety of groups that can roughly be divided into three. Despite very different experiences and histories, their common semi-peripheral position led them to form an alliance and contributed to the crystallisation of a Weltanschaung cleavage still prevalent in the current political arena.

The first of these groups was the urban bourgeoisie represented by the liberal General Zionists. Although this party aimed at integrating the government, it only collaborated with the Mapai in one government (in 1952) due to tensions related to socio-economic issues, namely the domination of the Mapai over the economic institutions.

The second group was constituted by former Jabotinsky movement’s members represented by Herut. Because of the latter’s action and position vis-à-vis the Mapai during the pre-state era, Ben-Gourion was totally reluctant towards the formation of a coalition with the Herut that was regarded as illegitimate as the communist party\textsuperscript{57}. Hence, the nationalist right wing party had no impact on the decision-making process during this period.

The last group that was not included in the centre was an aggregate of new immigrants from Oriental countries who had mainly arrived in the 1950s. During the first years, most of them tended to vote for the centre party and although Oriental lists competed for the elections they were quite weak compared to the percentage of Orientals in the population\textsuperscript{58}. The ideal of a melting-pot proclaimed by the labour leaders, the fact that Mapai was identified with the state, in which the new immigrants wanted to be integrated coupled with their dependence on the state’s institutions partly explains this situation. But the mismatch between the pioneer myth conveyed by the central elite and the Oriental reality -the establishment of the new immigrants in settlements that were

\textsuperscript{56} Kimmerling, Baruch, \emph{op.cit.}, p.91
\textsuperscript{57} Ben-Gurion’s motto concerning the coalition building process used to be “Without Herut and Maki [the Communist party]”. In “The Road to the Upheaval”, \emph{op.cit.}, p. 73.
\textsuperscript{58} In 1949, the Yemenite and the Sephardic lists together got 4.5% of the votes. See Herzog, Hanna, \emph{op.cit.}
The semi-peripheral stance and growing feeling of discontent toward the Labour pioneer institutions shared by the three groups progressively led them to form an oppositional alliance against the central pioneer elite. First, the General Zionists allied themselves with two Oriental lists; then they reunited with the Progressive Party to create the Liberal Party (1961); finally, in 1965, it created a new party with Herut: Gahal, which would later become the Likud. The merger of these parties and lists as well as the willingness to aggregate poor populations who essentially had in common their exclusion from the centre pushed the new right-wing political force to emphasise its opposition to the Labour elite, while reducing other aspects of its program like the liberal-bourgeois ideology or the issue of the indivisibility of the homeland dear to Herut. This strategy was to be successful: in the late 1960s, the Herut became the first Oriental political party in terms of electoral support, “the political home [...] for immigrants, long-terms disadvantaged and underprivileged” and the major secular alternative to the Labour party in the political arena.

The outcome of the pioneer-non pioneer relations established at the time was thus double. On the one hand, the common location of the three non-pioneer groups generated a process of alliance, as well as an aggregation by the right wing parties of the Oriental population, who soon represented its principal electoral support. On the other hand, the

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long domination of the political centre by the pioneer labour party and the semi-
peripheral position of non-pioneer social groups and political parties impeded
collaboration between both segments and produced a left vs. right cleavage.

*The non-crystallisation of the owner vs. capital division line*

Despite the prevalence of socio-economic division lines in the political arena during the
pre-state era, the class division has not turned into a structural political confrontation
during the second phase. Although class division exists in Israel, it can hardly be
characterised as a cleavage: class issues do not represent the major line of opposition
between political parties, there is no significant class consciousness\(^64\) and analyses
focusing on the link between class belonging and vote have shown that a lower class
status is correlated positively with a vote for right wing parties\(^65\).

The fact that the industrial revolution had already taken place before the national
revolution is not satisfactory to explain the lack of class cleavage. The reasons are
elsewhere. In Europe, the labour vs. capital cleavage emerged as a result of the industrial
revolution and related to conflicts of interests between both sectors. It was linked to the
workers’ precarious living conditions and frustrations and to their consequent massive
struggle for social and political rights. In Israel, such a clash was neutralised for different
reasons. The first reason was related to the Mapai and the right wing parties’ political
discourses. Already during the first period, the class struggle motto originally invoked by
the Mapai was moderated by the emphasis on the nation-building project and by the
identification between the working class and the nation\(^66\). The class rhetoric continued to
decline in the dominant party after independence to the profit of an interclass nationalist
ideology of statism\(^67\). The fact that the liberal bourgeois parties gave less predominance
to the capitalist ideal in order to aggregate the Oriental electorate during the second phase
also contributed to the diminishing of the class rhetoric. The second reason was related to

\(^66\) Dieckhoff, Alain, 1993, *op.cit.*
\(^67\) Horowitz, Dan, Lissak, Moshe, *op.cit.*, p.85
the socio-economic conditions in the country during the second phase. The importance of
the Mapai and of its institutions, especially the Histadrut, which acted as a union,
employment provider, health insurance, consumer benefits and balance between workers
and capital interests\(^{68}\); the very high rate of employment during the two first decades; and
the outcomes of the welfare state were all elements curbing the emergence of major
conflicts between workers and owners. The third reason was linked to the crosscutting
between class divisions and Weltanschaung cleavage. The interpretation by the Oriental
labourers of their socio-economic plight as the consequence of Mapai discrimination
against them, their opposition to its political and cultural domination and their consequent
aggregation by the nationalist liberal party, the Herut resulted in the blurring of class
consciousness and the neutralisation of the economic line of divisions in the political
system.

Hence, while the socio-economic issues remain a factor of division between left
and right, they are not structuring oppositions of the political arena and the respective left
and right electorate has not been mobilised and crystallised on this precise axis.

Three cleavages and four families of parties have thus crystallised during the second
phase (see table 3): a religious vs. secular cleavage, a left vs. right Weltanschaung
cleavage and a centre vs. periphery cleavage. In contrasts the Oriental vs. Ashkenazi
division has been aggregated by the right wing party and the class division has not
become an effective cleavage. As in Lipset and Rokkan’s model, cleavages thus
originally emerged as movement of opposition against the “established national elite
[here the Mapai] and its cultural standards”\(^{69}\). More precisely, the role of the centre and
the types of relationships it had with the other segments are the main explanatory factor
in the cleavages’ formation.

\(^{68}\) The trade union not only played the role of guardian of workers’ interests but also provided educational
structures, health insurances and work through its numerous societies, banks and companies and it acted as
a balance between workers interests and those of the capital. Bauer, Julien, \textit{op.cit.}, p.44

\(^{69}\) Lipset, Seymour, Rokkan, Stein, \textit{op.cit.}, p.23
### Table 3. Political families and cleavages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family</th>
<th>Cleavage</th>
<th>Original conflict</th>
<th>Social basis</th>
<th>Position</th>
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<td>Secular vs. Religious</td>
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<td>Right</td>
<td>Centre vs. semi-periphery</td>
<td>Opposition to domination of the labour.</td>
<td>Urban bourgeoisie; Oriental immigrants.</td>
<td>Semi-periphery of the system</td>
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<td>Weltanschaung left vs. Right cleavage</td>
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<td>Religious vs. secular;</td>
<td>Opposition to secular state</td>
<td>Religious groups. Ultra-Orthodox groups.</td>
<td>Collaboration with the centre</td>
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<td>Opposition to Zionism</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Periphery</td>
<td>Centre vs. periphery</td>
<td>Opposition to Zionism</td>
<td>Communists; Arabs.</td>
<td>Periphery of the system</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. The post-1967 era: realignment and stabilisation of the political system

One of Lipset and Rokkan’s crucial and controversial arguments is that political alternatives that had emerged before the full integration of all citizens in the suffrage in the 1920s have remained unaltered despite the change of the cleavages’ respective social basis. In Israel, such a critical juncture seems to have occurred during the 1967-1977 decade. This decade was indeed critical in many respects: first, because it saw the real insertion of the Arab minority into the political system (with the end of the military administration) and second because the outcomes of the six-day war generated a crucial realignment process in the political arena. After that critical decade, all the new political mobilisations emerged within the pre-existing political structures that had stabilised between 1967 and 1977.

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70 Lipset, Seymour M., Rokkan, Stein, *op.cit.*, p. 26-27
19677-1977: realignment on the Weltanschaung cleavage

The 1967 six-day war’s first impact on the political system certainly was the new prevalence of the left vs. right Weltanschaung cleavage and the realignment of the religious party on this cleavage. This process was due to several elements.

First, after 1967, the fate of the occupied territories became the main issue in the political arena, offering an opportunity for the Herut to bring back the principle of the unity of the homeland “from the fringes of consciousness to the core of national thought”\(^{71}\). This, on the one hand, reactivated the ancient line of division between the labour civic nationalist segment and the ethno-nationalist vision of the Herut. On the other hand, it offered the Herut’s social basis some positive common ideals and ethos - instead of the negative oppositional common basis against the labour movement that had been formed during the second phase -, hence reinforcing the cohesion and strength of the segment. Secondly, the six-day war had given the Herut a first occasion to take part in the national unity government with the centre party, hence increasing its legitimacy within the electorate\(^{72}\). As a result, the electoral support of Herut progressively increased - from 26 seats in the Knesset in 1969 to 39 seats in 1973 - and led the party to ultimately take power in 1977. This put an end to the Mapai’s dominant position, to the Herut’s semi-peripheral stance while giving the left vs. right Weltanschaung cleavage an increased importance in the competition.

In parallel, the religious camp started taking position on this collective identity line of division as well. Indeed, in the religious Zionist camp, the territorial expansion reactivated the religious vision of the holy land and ethno-nationalistic discourses started to be expressed within the religious segment. The movement created after the war to encourage the settlement in the occupied territories in the name of God - Gush Emunim - is probably the most obvious illustration of the new Zionist religious position on the territorial question. More surprisingly, this process was also at work in the ultra-orthodox camp, which started promoting nationalistic and expansionist principles in its program\(^{73}\).

\(^{71}\) Ibid. p.76.
\(^{73}\) Hazan, Reuven, 2000, op.cit., p.126.
The six-day war thus had three major consequences on the political spectrum. First, it led to the end of the dominant party era and to the insertion of the right wing parties into the political centre. Second, it generated a *rapprochement* between religious parties and the right wing parties whose visions and ethos had now acquired common elements. Third, and consequently, it led to the dominance of the left vs. right collective identity cleavage in the political arena. Since then, the left vs. right Weltanschaunng cleavage has become the major structuring element of the political party system as well as of electoral behaviours.\(^{74}\)

*The post-critical juncture era: mobilisations in old structures*

After the reconfiguration of the political system in 1967-1977, several new forms of political mobilisations emerged in the political party system. Although important and despite their novel character, it appears that none of them have been able to produce a change in the political structures that had crystallised before 1967. On the contrary, the observation of these parties’ path reveals that those which have been able to maintain their representation in the Knesset actually integrated the pre-existing political structures.

Among the successful new types of mobilisations, the first one took place among the Arab minority due to two factors. First, the end of military rule in 1965 gave greater opportunity to the Arab populations to form political associations and lists of candidates for elections\(^{75}\). Secondly, the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip by Israel generated contacts between the Israeli Arabs and the Palestinians, which produced a shift

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\(^{74}\) Shamir, Michal, Arian, Asher, “Collective Identity and Electoral Competition in Israel”, *American Political Science Review*, 1999, vol.93 (2), pp.265-277. In their analysis, the authors distinguish the external and internal dimensions of collective identity. The first is related to state’s borders and relations to the Arab world, the second to the vision of the nation-state and the state, both of these dimensions overlapping. They show that although issue voting has grown in Israel, the position on the collective identity is still structuring the vote.

\(^{75}\) The capacity of the Arab minority to create political lists was however still limited because lists challenging the notion of Israel as a Jewish state were prohibited, first through practices, and later by virtue of a law.
in the identity of the Arab minority\textsuperscript{76}. These combined elements created a dynamic within the Arab populations that ultimately produced new types of political parties\textsuperscript{77}. The novelty of the post-1967 mobilisations in comparison with those that existed before - namely, the communist lists - mainly consisted in the emphasis on nationalist discourse. Moreover, even though the communist party was predominantly composed of Arab members, it had continuously presented itself as a Jewish-Arab party, even after it split in 1961. In contrast, the new parties aimed at being the specific representative of the Arab populations\textsuperscript{78}. Despite these differences, all these parties put forward similar core claims and aimed at representing the periphery: they all called for the establishment of a non-Zionist state and demanded greater integration of the Arab minority within the state.

The second major type of successful political mobilisation appeared within the Oriental segment in the form of so-called “ethnic” political parties. In the Israeli discourse, the notion of ethnicity refers to differences in terms of origins among Jews, opposing roughly Ashkenazi to Oriental Jews\textsuperscript{79}. As mentioned above, during the first and second phases, Oriental lists were not successful in gaining substantial votes and the ethnic line of division was merely politicised and even less institutionalised. The frustrations of new immigrants were thus either expressed through non-organised and direct actions and progressively through a dealignement from the Mapai to the profit of its secular opponent Herut and later Likud, which successfully took advantage of the Orientals’ frustrations\textsuperscript{80}. The Oriental populations’ aggregation by the Likud increased the obstacles to the achievement of any Oriental political movement, at least in the secular sphere\textsuperscript{81}. The leeway was larger in the religious segment and it is indeed in the

\textsuperscript{76} See on that topic, Rouhana, Nadim, “The collective identity of the Palestinian Citizens in Israel”, \textit{Asian and African Studies}, 1993, vol.27 (1-2) and Rouhana, Nadim, 1989, \textit{op.cit.}

\textsuperscript{77} Among these are the Progressive List for Peace, a split from the communist party (1981) originally composed of both Jews and Arabs, the Arab Democratic Party (1984) and Balad (1996).


\textsuperscript{79} Although the notion of ethnicity does not appear to us as the most relevant, it is the most commonly used, at least since the end of the 1960s to refer to this opposition

\textsuperscript{80} In the 1981 electoral campaign, the Likud, not only exploited the anti-Labour feelings among Oriental populations but directly stressed the ethnic dimension, by presenting itself as the real defender of the Oriental population against the Ashkenazi Labour elite.

\textsuperscript{81} In the 1970s, the Black Panther, a movement fighting for the socio-economic equality of the Orientals gained support among the society but failed to ever become a mass movement and to enter into the Knesset Smooha, Sammy, 1978, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 202
latter sphere that the first successful political mobilisation of the Oriental populations occurred: first in the Zionist religious segment with Tami (1981), which soon declined and disappeared in 1988, and then in the ultra-orthodox segment, with Shas (1984), which became the third party and a coalition partner in 1996, 1999 and 2006. Both parties aimed at expressing religious Oriental members’ discontent toward their semi-peripheral position within the existing political structures.

Two elements should be highlighted regarding this new form of ethnic mobilisation. First, it was successful only in the religious segment, confirming the weight of pre-existing political structures (here the previous absorption of the Orientals within the Weltanschaung cleavage). Second, although Shas’s electoral platform was largely ethnic-orientated in the first years, the party progressively took position on the right side of the left vs. right cleavage Weltanschaung cleavage, which is now fully integrated in its own identity and that of its supporters.\(^\text{82}\)

On the other hand, after the critical juncture of 1967-1977, new political parties attempted to overcome or to ignore the cleavages or pre-existing political families. Up to now, they have not been able to keep electoral representation very long. A first type of these new parties were set up by Russian new immigrants. After the massive wave of immigration from the ex-Soviet Union, two parties based on the defence of economic, cultural and political rights of the Russian immigrants - Israel Be-Alyah and Israel Beytenu - were formed, both of which had remarkable results in the 1996 and 1999 elections. However, Israel Be-Alyah lost its support and ultimately integrated the Likud while Israel Beytenu progressively positioned itself on the left-right cleavage.\(^\text{83}\) Other set of parties formed outside cleavages were those presenting themselves as “centre parties” (Democratic Movement for Change/DMC, Change, Centre Party). Some of them succeeded in gaining representation in the Knesset as the party Change, and the DMC even took part in the government. However, similarly to the Russian parties, all these


\(^{83}\) At the far right of the left right axis as it promotes very ethno-nationalist means to resolve the Israeli Arab conflict: the transfer of the Arab population outside of Israeli borders and the end of territorial concessions. Israel Beytenu’s platform: [http://beytenu.org/](http://beytenu.org/), visited on 16 May 2007.
parties eventually either took position on the *Weltanschaung* cleavage or lost their political representation. All the same, a few parties promoting “post-materialist” values emerged after the juncture (Green Leaves and the Greens) but none of them has ever been able to get over the threshold to enter the Knesset by now.

Finally, the case of the secular political party - Shinui- formed in 1999 shows even more clearly the importance of pre-existing political structures. Although Shinui was erected on a pre-existing cleavage (the religious vs. secular cleavage, as a promoter of secularism), after two great electoral victories in 1999 and 2003, the party ultimately disappeared. This failure could be explained either by the weight of pre-established political families (as Shinui emerged outside from any political family) or by the fact that the party had tried to ignore the now predominant left vs. right *Weltanschaung* cleavage. In either case, it seems to confirm the significance of political structures constituted before the critical juncture and the difficulty for political parties to overcome them.

Three important elements can thus be highlighted from what has been mentioned. First, after the 1967-1977 critical juncture, all the parties that were formed had to take position alongside the predominant left vs. right *Weltanschaung* cleavage in order to survive. Secondly, the prevalence of the latter cleavage did not bring about the end of the other cleavages: the strong roots, institutionalisation and long histories of both the religious vs. secular and the centre vs. periphery cleavages have constituted a barrier impeding their dilution. Finally and above all, during the post-critical juncture era, all the new successful political parties were formed within one of the four pre-existing political families structured by the three major cleavages previously depicted, hence confirming Lipset and Rokkan’s freezing hypothesis.

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Table 4. Cleavages and successful political parties after the 1967-1977 critical juncture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family</th>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Cleavage</th>
<th>Original position toward the centre</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td>Labour Party, Meretz, Ratz, Yachad</td>
<td>Left vs. Right</td>
<td>Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right</td>
<td>Likud, Israel Beiteinu</td>
<td>Left vs. Right</td>
<td>Semi-periphery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>Tami, Shas, National Religious Party, Agudat Israel, Front of the Torah</td>
<td>Centre vs. Semi-Periphery and</td>
<td>Semi-periphery, Collaboration with the centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Religious vs. Secular and Weltanschaung cleavage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Periphery</td>
<td>Communist Arab party (Hadash), Nationalist Arab party (Progressive List for Peace, Arab Democratic Party, Balad)</td>
<td>Centre vs. Periphery</td>
<td>Periphery</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Conclusion**

In spite of the fact that Israeli history largely deviates from that of the European countries, using Lipset and Rokkan’s paradigm turns out to be very fruitful in the analysis of the Israeli cleavages’ formation process and the structuring of its political party system. Using this theoretical framework has helped us identify the relevant long-term processes in the political structures: the pre-state phase; the post-independence phase and the 1967-1977 critical juncture. It has also led us to analyse the conditions and reasons why from the four lines of division that emerged in the pre-state era, only three crystallised as cleavages translating in four political families: the centre vs. periphery cleavage (periphery family); the religious vs. secular cleavage (religious family) and the left vs. right Weltanschaung cleavage - originally centre vs. semi-periphery cleavage - (left and right families); and why the latter became prevalent after the six-day war.

The socio-historical perspective has also helped us explaining the deep rooting of these three cleavages and has confirmed the credibility of the freezing hypothesis. Although the exact moment of the political alternatives’ freezing can be discussed, it
appears very clearly that after the years 1967-1977, political structures and alternatives that had formed before 1967-1977 were not altered: since 1977, all the new political mobilisations were formed within the framework of an existing political family or ultimately disappeared. Hence, beyond the heterogeneity of the Israeli political system and despite the creation of new parties for every election and the very high fragmentation of the Knesset, political mobilisations can all be analysed through the three distinguished cleavages’ framework. Identifying these three cleavages and the consequent four political families both gives us a useful analytical framework to classify political parties and simplify the seeming complexity of the Israeli political party system and, above all can provide us with a very useful tool to explain the success and failure of new political parties.
Appendix

1. Glossary of main political parties

Left

**Zionist political family**
- Ratz

**Non-Zionist family**
- Rakah, Hadash: 1984: Communist Arab party.
- Progressive List for Peace: a split from the communist party (1981) originally composed of both Jews and Arab.
- National Democratic Assembly: Arab party created in 1996.

**Centre parties**
- Democratic Movement for Change
- Change
- Centre

Right

**Nationalist parties**
- General Zionists: liberal party defending the middle class. Joined Herut in 1965 to form Gahal.
- Hérou: Revisionist party. Defends an ethno-nationalist ethos and territorial expansionism.
- Gahal, Likoud (1975): Alliance between Herut and the liberals.
- Israel Be

**Religious parties**
- Agudat Israel: Ultra Orthodox party created in 1912 to impede the realisation of the Zionist project. Was first divided in the Workers’ Agudat Israel and Agudat Israel and merged in 1955 to form Agudat Israel. In the 1980s a group split with the party to form the Front of the Torah.
- Shas: party formed in 1984 by ex-Agudat Israel’s members.
2. Electoral results 1948-1973 (in number of seats obtained in the Knesset)

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Elections results from 1977 to 2003

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