Values in the EU policies and discourse. A first assessment.

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Abstract

This working paper presents the results of a preliminary empirical research by the project ValEUR. In the last decades, the enlargements of the European Union and the constitution-making process triggered debates on the common values susceptible to hold European countries and citizens together and to justify public action. This paper focuses on the extent, modalities and meanings of the use of values in EU institutional discourse in the period 2000-2015. The role of values as objects of policy action and/or resources for political legitimation is analysed in four policy sectors: institutional communication, identity (education, culture, citizenship, memory), religion and the rule of law. Through qualitative content analysis for each policy sector, we determine the conditions for the emergence and use of values in institutional discourses, the salience of values in these discourses, the possible differences/distribution of roles among the EU institutions and finally the meanings and functions attributed to values.

Résumé

Ce papier présente les résultats d’une recherche préliminaire du projet ValEUR. Au cours des dernières décennies, les élargissements de l’Union européenne et le processus constitutionnel ont donné lieu à des débats sur les valeurs communes susceptibles d’unir les pays et les citoyens européens et de justifier l’action publique. Ce papier étudie l’étendue, les modalités et les significations du recours aux valeurs dans le discours institutionnels de l’UE sur la période 2000-2015. Le rôle des valeurs comme objets d’action publique et/ou comme sources de légitimation politique est étudié dans quatre secteurs : la communication institutionnelle, l’identité (éducation, culture, citoyenneté, mémoire), la religion et l’état de droit. A travers une analyse qualitative pour chaque secteur, nous déterminons les conditions de l’émergence et de l’usage des valeurs dans les discours institutionnels, la fréquence de ces valeurs, les possibles différences/partage des rôles entre institutions et enfin les significations et fonctions attribuées aux valeurs.
INTRODUCTION

Values at the core of European integration have been widely discussed in recent years due to several major developments in EU governance. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the enlargement of the EU and the constitution-making process were structures of opportunities for claims to define common values susceptible to hold European countries and citizens together and to justify European public policy. Nevertheless, increasing resistances to Europeanization showed that interpretations of these common values may differ. The project ValEUR\(^1\) intends to explore these dynamics through three dimensions, which correspond to three incentives that can lead to a political mobilization of values. Firstly, it may be an instrumental call to identity, memory and communicative resources in a quest for legitimization (governing through values). An example is the invocation of the Christian heritage of Europe to comfort a common culture pre-existing the nation-states. Secondly, it may come from the necessity to deal with ethical issues calling for normative policy choices (governing values). Illustration are debates about human dignity regarding abortion, euthanasia, stem cells or gender and sexual rights. Thirdly, values may take the floor and disrupt the usual European policy patterns, cause legal and political conflicts and challenge either the EU as a political system or its policies (governed by values). Examples may be references to social justice, equality and sovereignty as European ideals to contest austerity. The EU has encountered the three scenarios. In each configuration, “European values” are invoked with different meanings and purposes. These scenarios may be concomitant with several versions of European values in competition or shift from one to another. The purpose of the project ValEUR is to map these logics at work to show how values become a key dimension of European politics, either producing reassurance and consensus or creating even more tensions and uncertainties.

As the first step of this project, this working paper has only for ambition to offer a general picture of the extent, modalities and meanings of the references to values. It focuses strictly on the discourses of EU institutions, without encompassing the reception

\(^1\) http://cevipol.ulb.ac.be/sites/default/files/arc-corrige.pdf.
and circulation of this discourse in the political, public and social spheres, dimensions that will be explored further in future publications. Four policy sectors are analysed as particularly relevant regarding the role of values as objects of policy action and/or resources or constraints for political justification: institutional communication, identity (education, culture, citizenship, memory), religion, the rule of law. For each of these areas, we constituted a corpus of texts representative of the main actors and issues in the sector. Our main objective is to determine when, how and why values are mobilized in institutional documents that present, explain and justify EU action in the respective policy domains. We therefore look at the changing contexts in which values are referred to, at the actors who refer to these values and finally at the meanings and functions they are given. Which are the values invoked? Are they understood as natural, absolute, or can they be subject of change and compromise on their scope and meaning? Who mobilize and owns them? Are “European values” invoked strictly in internal affairs or do they pop up also in external affairs, through self-differentiation of the EU from other political communities?

In order to address these questions, we constituted a corpus of official documents for each of the policy sectors under scrutiny, starting in 2000, when the EU engaged in a constitutional process that revived debates on the normative foundations and historical roots of the European political order. We constituted for each sector a sample of official documents for the period 2000-2015. We selected documents with a programmatic dimension: they either present the existing objectives and initiatives of EU institutions or call for an improved action in the sector, and therefore expose the rationales behind planned or desired policy measures, the goal being to identify the role of values in such institutional discourses. This corpus, more specifically presented for each policy sector in the corresponding section, reflects as a whole the variety of sources and institutional logics at work (national, supranational, community, intergovernmental or mixed), and the diversity of types of discourses, especially coordinative vs. communicative ones.\(^2\) (see Annex for detailed description of the

\(^2\) According to Schmidt, coordinative discourses are held by actors (decision-makers, experts, organized interests, public figures) that coordinate the building of political issues. Communicative discourses are produced by political actors (politicians, advisors, spokespersons, activists) that develop the ideas of the coordinative discourse to address a larger audience, either the citizens or other groups that do not contribute directly to the building of political problems but may react to it. Both coordinative and communicative discourses mix cognitive and normative dimensions, even if the communicative discourse is more likely to emphasize the mobilization of values to beyond sectoral specificities. cf. Schmidt, Vivien A., Democracy in Europe. The EU and National Polities, Oxford, Oxford UP, 2006, p. 253-256.
corpus). Textual analysis software (Nvivo) is used to establish the salience of the term “values” in each corpus and locate its occurrences. Data visualization in the form of word trees and word clouds offers a generic picture of the sample, highlighting general trends corroborated by the state of the art regarding the different policy areas. Each corpus is examined using qualitative content analysis. In order to determine whether “values” are more mobilized in certain policy sectors, we first established the salience of “values” in the overall corpus, with all sector corpura aggregated: it is 0.15%. We could then compare this figure to the one obtain in the corpus of the different policy areas. In the first three sections, the method was then to analyse the institutional discourse when “values” are mentioned as such. The identification of occurrences of “values” in the institutional texts and the analysis of the argumentation surrounding these occurrences allows for an exploration of the rhetoric mobilized when dealing with values. In the last section, the same method is applied, but for one specific value, the rule of law, in order to follow the evolution of a value identified as cardinal in the EU institutional texts.

The paper is constituted by four parts dealing with each policy sector and organized as follows. In each part, Section 1 presents the conceptual and historical background, the significant actors and the relevance of values for this specific policy sector. Section 2 informs about the salience of values in the institutional texts and specifies which types of values are at stake. Finally, Section 3 analyses the rhetorical uses of values that are made in order to explain and justify specific policy actions.

The paper proposes to highlight several aspects. First, the EU institutions use values instrumentally to bind a European community together and justify political actions. Presented as a foundation of EU identity, they are considered self-evident but rarely given any stable and clear substance. “European values” such as transparency or coherence are invested with a normative authority by the institutional discourse but may be considered as mere technocratic principles or alien concepts in other spheres. Moreover, while understood as inherently European, some values can also be referred to as universal. In this ambiguous self-definition/othering process, the boundaries between the inside and the outside are blurred.

These figures are obtained with Nvivo word frequency. It corresponds to the frequency of the word relative to the total words counted (words longer than 5 letters). The weighted percentage assigns a portion of the word’s frequency to each group so that the overall total does not exceed 100%.
1. VALUES IN THE INSTITUTIONAL COMMUNICATION OF THE EU

1.1 Context and actors

When it comes to the role of values, the scientific debate about the institutional communication of the EU focuses on two main interconnected questions. The first question concerns the nature of European discourse, either normative or rational, and the kind of mobilization/loyalty it aims at creating (referring also to the type of European identity in the making, cf. 2.). This relates to the nature of “values” that are referred to by European institutions, from functional principles (transparency, dialogue) to broad political paradigms (democracy). The second question deals with values in relation to the constitution or absence of a European public space as container and matrix of normative debate, reflecting a lack of political community.

This second question has drawn most intellectual and political attention in recent years. There has been an enduring academic debate on the possibility and nature of a European public sphere, a space where issues of European public interest would be discussed, which could ultimately shape and legitimize EU level policies (Habermas 1989; Eriksen 2004; Morganti and Bekemans 2012). Such public sphere would begin to compensate the EU democratic deficit (Moussis 2011). At the policy level, the EU has increasingly emphasized the importance of creating a well-functioning public sphere. The Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue, Debate (2005), the Action Plan to Improve Communicating Europe (2005) The White Paper on a European Communication Policy (2006) and other documents have all stressed the three main principles of the EU strategy to encourage the emergence of a public sphere. However, the theory has not been put into practice (or at least not successfully). Various European transnational news media were launched in order to promote and give life to a European public sphere, but many attempts in this area were short-lived and/or are limited to a niche, elite audience that has failed so far to gather momentum (Heinderyckx 2015).
In the last decade, the popularity of the EU has sunk among its citizens. In just a few years EU leaders have witnessed a major shift from the permissive consensus to a “constraining dissensus” (Down and Wilson 2008; Hooghe and Marks 2009). The worsening image of the EU has created the conditions for putting into question the very legitimacy of the integration project. In search for narratives, values may re-emerge in the institutional communication as an antidote to perceived grievances against the EU project.

We constituted a corpus of publications (25 documents) that present the communication policy of the EU institutions: key documents by the Commission (Action Plan to improve communicating Europe, 2005; Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue, Debate, 2005; White Paper on European Communication Policy, 2006), speeches and press releases by the Commission, a European Parliament (EP) study and a recommendation of the Committee of the Regions (CoR).

1.2 Salience and nature of values

In this corpus, the salience of the term “values” is similar to the salience for the overall corpus (0.15%). We can observe a significant increase from 2008 onwards. This might be related to the fact that the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) gave more visibility to values in its Article 2: “the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail”. Values are referred to in various ways such as “European values”, “EU values”, “our values”, “common values” or “values of Europe”.

Most of the time, all EU institutions represented in the corpus (Commission, EP and CoR) refer in these documents to “values” without elaborating, let alone defining them in any way. However, they mention them in slightly contrasting ways. The Commission mostly insists on values as common, as underpinning a certain European model or identity. The Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and
Debate (2005) mentions “the common values on which the economic and social models in Europe are based”. In her speech Safeguarding Media Pluralism in the EU (2012) Neelie Kroes, then Vice-President of the European Commission responsible for the Digital Agenda, insists that the “EU is grounded in common values like freedom of speech” and that as a consequence “political pressure [must be exercised] on Member States that risk violating our common values.” Since the values are founding part of the EU, communication consists in promoting them: “DG Communication will explore with broadcasters and production companies genuine formats to promote the idea, values and benefits of Europe.” (Action Plan to improve communicating Europe 2005).

It is the same philosophy of promoting existing values that appears in the CoR report Reconnecting Europe with its citizens (2014) which focuses on concrete measures: “It is the responsibility of the European institutions to put forward a new, partnership-based approach to communication about the European project so as to strengthen people”s attachment to the EU. This decentralised, creative process should entail the institutions agreeing on a unifying communication concept that explains the advantages of the European Union, its identity, rationale, values and the actual results of its policies in people’s lives.” The contradictory nature of this recommendation is striking. On the one hand, communication should be “decentralised” but on the other hand, the approach to essential and potentially debated elements such as the EU identity, rationale and values should be decided a priori among the EU institutions. This assumption that values should be pre-defined at institutional level also appears in the CoR”s proposal to modify the design of Euro banknotes, so that “personalities representing EU values feature on euro banknotes”.

This contradiction can also be found in the EP’s study Communicating “Europe” to its citizens: state of affairs and prospects (2014). The document recommends “launching a discussion on what European values are and integrating them consistently in future communication activities” (p.4). However, the same study
proposes “[b]etter training of officials on how to communicate policies and EU values to different target groups (EU citizens, but also the media)” (p.4). Paradoxically, the first recommendation suggests a definition of European values through debate, while the second assumes institutionally predefined European values.

Values are mentioned when dealing with information and communication technologies and the digital economy, in relation with the public sphere, but also with privacy. For instance, Commissioner Neelie Kroes in charge of the Digital Agenda, explained in 2011: “we must ensure that the digital transition preserves and enhances European core values. Values like democracy. As I said to the OECD recently, Internet-based tools can foster democratic life, for example by providing platforms for discussion and collective action. And the same goes for rights and values which we Europeans hold important, like diversity, freedom, privacy and the protection of children”. Action in the field of Internet is therefore justified through values in both defensive and offensive ways: in order to preserve as well as to promote them.

### 1.3 Uses of values

All actors most often use values in an instrumental way. “European values” are referred to as something abstract enough to justify a wide variety of decisions. Values are systematically related to and “owned” indistinctly by the EU as a political system and Europe as a civilizational area. The EU is a value in itself that must be defended per se. However, in certain occasions, core values of the EU are referred to as “global” and belonging also to non-Europeans. The ownership of values is situational and adjusted to the partner involved. For example, in the context of Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations, reference to both American and European values appear: “The fact is: fundamentally the EU and US share many values. The differences between us show – not how far apart we are – but how much we can learn from each other to promote those values” or “These are not just European values; they are American too. When those same settlers left Europe, they were
not afraid to change; but equally they did not abandon their vital **values**. And today, together Europe and the US are the world’s natural home of freedom and democracy.” (A *transatlantic digital single market?* 2014). A Euro-centric genealogy is established: the values were born in Europe and taken across the Atlantic. A hierarchy is also created: if these values are global, there are best represented by the EU and the US. This superiority is not explained since it is conceived as “natural”.

In the institutional discourses of the EU analysed here – by contrast with the general public sphere where the topic is even less salient and much more controversial –, European values are treated as a given, taken for granted, inherent to Europe’s identity. When mentioned, they are often related to the EU’s self-definition, to its goals and rationales as a bureaucratic and policy framework rather than as a full polity. Even when conceived as Western or global, an essential link is maintained between certain core values (democracy and freedom) and Europe, which claims the authorship of these universal references.

### 2. VALUES IN EU “IDENTITY” POLICIES: EDUCATION, CULTURE, CITIZENSHIP AND MEMORY

#### 2.1 Context and actors

The purpose here is to focus on policy areas closely related to identity/community building. Public policies in these sectors played a crucial role in the emergence and strengthening of the nation-states. Several scholars wondered whether such a mechanism was reproduced at the European level (Shore 2000). A recent literature has revealed the identity-building objectives of EU policies in these fields (among others, Soysal 2002 for education; Sassatelli 2009 and Calligaro 2013 for culture; Calligaro and Foret 2014, Sierp 2014 for memory). EU programmes and actions in these domains are openly designed to strengthen European citizenship, to promote a sense of belonging to the EU, or at least to Europeanize activities that are directly related to the collective identity and self-perception of the citizens. When the EP proposed a
Community action in the field of cultural heritage in 1970s, one of the objectives was to show the EU’s interest for “non-commercial”, artistic and cultural values. The bounds uniting the citizens to European integration had to be more than merely materialistic. This need became all the more obvious with the introduction of European citizenship in the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. The EU officially received competences in the fields of culture and education and the programmes designed in the areas were partly meant to illustrate and diffuse common European values, basis of this European citizenship. Finally, the 2004 enlargement induced an increased cultural diversity of European citizens, which led the European institutions to put even more focus on shared values as common cultural ground.

In order to make a first assessment of the status and role of values in these policy fields, a systematic analysis of key policy documents was conducted. The corpus was constituted as follows: for the period 2000-2015, we collected the documents establishing the main programmes for each policy sector (51 documents related to 13 EU programmes). Since only the final versions of these documents are taken into consideration, these documents do not reflect a coordinative discourse but a communicative discourse, designed to present the motives, objectives and modalities of the programmes. They are the reference documents for local and national stakeholders interested in participating in such programmes.

2.2 Salience and nature of values

The salience of the word “values” in the corpus is weak (0.09% against 0.15% for the global corpus) but when mentioned, values appear early in the documents, in paragraphs explaining the motives and rationales behind a specific EU action. Values are mostly mentioned in programmes related to memory and citizenship, less in the field of culture. At the exception of one text issued after the attack on Charlie Hebdo in 2015, which insists on the role of education in promoting citizenship, values are completely absent from the decisions related to education. This reflects a Europe defined more in reference to a common heritage and in civic terms and less as a community-of-being, a shared awareness and a voluntarist enrolment.

For each occurrence of the term, we established which values were mentioned and in which context, in order to establish the different types of values and their respective salience: Democracy (15), freedom (14), tolerance (11), solidarity (11), the rule of law
(10), human rights (9), equality (6), respect for human dignity (4), justice (4), equality between women and men (4), fairness (3), freedom of speech (1), security (1), respect for individuals (1), good governance (1), and culture (1). There is a hierarchy established among values. More than once, the syntagma “core values” is used and usually refers to the values listed in the Art. 2 of the TEU and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. In the programme “Fundamental rights and Citizenship” designed by the DG Justice, the core values are “freedom, security, justice”: quite logically, the DG puts to the fore the domains for which it is directly competent. In one document, there is a reference to a use of “common values in the broadest sense”, this broad sense taking into account “gender equality, tolerance, mutual understanding, intercultural dialogue and reconciliation”. This reference to the broadest realm of values implies a certain hierarchy among values, some being at the core, others at the periphery.

In two cases, values are mobilized in order to underline what they are not, to denounce specific ideologies or behaviour. In the case of memory action, values are defined against a negative European heritage: “The Union is an area of shared values which are incompatible with crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes, including crimes committed by totalitarian regimes.” In one occurrence, criminality is conceived as an infringement of EU values: “Common EU interests must be protected against criminal behaviour […] because it offends EU common values, such as respect for individuals, democracy and good governance.”

With the exception of two occurrences where values are described as “universal” and indivisible” and both “European and international”, values are always related to Europe or the EU. In this corpus, the EU/the Union and Europe/European are interchangeable. The conflation of the European Union and Europe is a resilient rhetorical device in EU official discourse (Calligaro 2013).

2.3 Uses of values

In the corpus, values are often naturalized, described as a given. As such, they are strongly associated with the definition of identity and the conception of membership to a European community. Each time that the syntagma European identity is used, it is associated, in the same sentence or paragraph, with values. It appears that values play a central role in the establishment of community boundaries since “values
[should] interact according to the humanist conception of identities and differences”. Values therefore appear as vectors of differentiation and identification. In relation to identity, “values – both tangible and intangible –” are also constitutive of a European cultural heritage. In the corpus, values appear in several occasions next to “history”, “culture” and “roots”, which also relate to a heritage, a given, an “already there”. This idea is strengthened by the association between values and achievements: “Europe’s values and achievements” or “achievements and values of the European Union”. In this approach values are not thought or discussed, they are inherited.

The connection is also very strong between values and European citizenship. When addressed, European citizenship is almost systematically related to values. Citizenship is described as a political construct whose foundations are values. In this citizenship/identity construction, values have a specific function, which is partly psychological and emotional: “EU citizenship should not be confined to an individual rights-based approach, but should have a strong value-based dimension so as to foster Europeans’ sense of belonging to a common European project”. In this sentence, it appears that in this EU institutional context, rights are not sufficient to bring about an emotional attachment to the EU. It is suggested that the attachment to values, and not the adhesion to the EU as a legal order, can create a sense of belonging to the EU.

As a result, values are also repeatedly presented as a catalyst of cohesion and a means to deal with increasing diversity in Europe, especially in face of two challenges: the 2004 enlargement and the context of an ageing and shrinking working-age population and more sustained immigration flows. In such a context, the “shared values [...] which hold our societies together, become more important than ever”. Values are thus described as social bounds that make membership and solidarity possible. As a consequence, the institutional texts make clear that it is necessary to encourage a “sense of European identity and ownership, based on common values”. Because they can supposedly create this cohesion and sense of belonging to/ownership of the EU, values are key to strategies which aim at strengthening popular support for the EU, and as a consequence, the EU’s legitimacy: “For citizens to give their full support to European integration, greater emphasis should therefore be placed on common cultural values and roots as a key element of their identity”.

Values are thus not ends in themselves but means for political, social and economic purposes.

The EU programmes under scrutiny systematically propose a promotion of European values through different types of actions: “identify”, “strengthen”, “promote”, “teach”, “uphold”, “disseminate”, etc. Beyond promotion, it is advocated to “share and exchange experiences, opinions and values” or to “feed the debate [...] on European values and cultures”. The idea of an exchange of, or debate on values seems to not correspond to the approach of static values underlined above. If values can be debated and exchanged upon, then they can evolve and be acquired.

The corpus of texts defining programmes in the fields of education, culture, citizenship and memory reveals the instrumental dimension of values. Values are used to draw the boundaries of a European identity partly defined in ethno-cultural terms in reference to history and heritage, but less to present times. This approach shows also the limits of the self-proclaimed cosmopolitanism of the EU through the resilient claim for authorship of universal values.

3. EUROPEAN VALUES AND RELIGION

3.1 Context and actors

The previous corpus further demonstrated how values were associated both to a EU identity and to a more intimate identity of the individual, to his/her history, his/her roots, which is supposed to resonate with a larger European community. Religion can be an important element of this multi-layered identity construct. Religion has always been a fertile ground for the irruption of values in politics. For centuries, it played an anthropological role as a normative matrix for public choice and collective identity and as a potent institutional player (Gentile 2005). Today, it keeps a subdued but resilient status as a trace influencing voting and political attitudes, as a vicarious memory and cultural material available for various identity strategies and as an active part of civil society (Berger et al. 2008).

When it comes to religion, European integration has been interpreted in two opposite directions: as an interest-based process leaving little place to ideational factors and dismantling national traditional values; but also as a Christian-Democrat endeavour
reinforcing the stronghold of Catholicism on the continent, and a “Christian club” confronted to other civilizations in international affairs. Yet for decades, the debate between these two competing visions remained secondary and abstract. It has dramatically re-emerged on the EU agenda, especially with the debate on the Christian heritage of Europe at the end of the 1990s-beginning of the 2000s. Discussing a would-be European constitution brought us back to the values at the foundation of a European political community, and hence to religion (Foret 2015, Brent & Guth 2014, Leustean 2014, McCrea 2010). Further initiatives which offered an arena to the discussion of religion at EU level have been the progressive institutionalization of the dialogue between presidents of European institutions and communities of faith and conviction (article 17 of the Treaty); and the formalization of an external policy regarding religious issues, especially the production of guidelines on freedom of religion and belief by the European External Action Service (EEAS) in 2013.

Like in many sectors of policy-making and interest representation, the European Commission is the organizer, the interlocutor and the gatekeeper of the dialogue with the public sphere, civil society and lobbies. As such, the Commission fares well in general speeches on values. These speeches are frequently articulated by the president of the institution addressing religious organizations or a larger audience. In these circumstances, there is a communicative discourse declining abstract notions in a consensual way without much connection with policy-making.

As the representative assembly expressing the political and cultural diversity of European societies, the EP is the most likely arena for the politicization of religion. It has indeed happened in some controversies (like the Buttiglione affair in 2004 for example) but religiously loaded problems have increasingly being accommodated to the usual logics of the EP. The progressive institutionalization of religion as a policy object has reduced the space available for the most normative discourses. The progressive commitment of MEPs to scrutinize how religious issues – especially related to religious freedom – are dealt with has led to the development of coordinative discourses aiming at a common ground between all European institutional players. In short, in the way to deal with values through religious topics, the Commission is more political and the Parliament more technocratic that what could be expected.

The EEAS is a new player in the game as religion has imposed itself willy-nilly on the agenda of the EU under the pressure of geopolitical questions (terrorism, political Islam,
freedom of religion) and the influence of other international arenas (UN, Council of Europe, etc.). European diplomats tend to restrain themselves to a language as neutral and consensual as possible but their external counterparts or third actors (media, civil society) may give a very political interpretation of their discourse.

European judges contribute heavily to frame European politics and policies towards religion by creating a legal universe ex ante, by settling conflicts in courts ex post and by influencing national jurisprudences. Even if religion does not enter in the scope of competencies of the EU, judges have developed their own jurisprudence that has moved back and forth but tends to recognize the agency of the member states through notions such as the margin of appreciation left to national authorities or the cultural rather than religious values of some symbols. Doing so, they stick to the legal repertoire but state messages that frame political discourse and can have strong normative effects. Subsidiarity, principle of subsidiarity or distinction between active/passive and cultural/religious symbols are example of legal terms endowed with a powerful political meaning.

To explore the role of these different actors and how they resort to values, a corpus was composed as follows: discourses by successive presidents of the Commission in meetings with religious and philosophical communities and in some other related events; official documents and reports (Commission and European external action service guidelines, EP reports); press releases by the European Commission, mostly following meetings with communities of faith and conviction, to illustrate the discourse when it aims at the public sphere (see details in Annex).

3.2 Salience and nature of values

The salience of “values” in the institutional discourse related to religion is slightly more significant that in the other corpura (0.22% against 0.15% for the global corpus). As far as it is possible to identify some trends, the context seems more important than the source or the content. To address a more political audience is likely to be the crucial element to invoke more or less the “values”. However, the frequent overlapping of coordinative and communicative discourses in European politics blurs the logic. Guidelines on religious freedom elaborated by the EEAS are a technical document by nature and scores relatively low in terms of occurrences of “value” but are nevertheless turned into a joint manifesto of European ideals and disseminated within
the international civil society. Conversely, debates within the EP are sometimes very technical and circumscribed to a legal repertoire. The elusiveness of the term “value” simply confirms the propensity to rationalization and functionalism of European institutional discourse.

Some significant features emerge from content analysis. Among the most prominent European values, freedom ranks first beyond contestation, “freedom” in general or freedom of thought, expression or religion. Peace is a solid second. Others follow from a distance like solidarity, prosperity, democracy, tolerance, respect, or dignity. The rejection of violence appears as a value in itself. Value may be characterized as “human”, “ethical”, “intellectual” or “spiritual”.

The singular “religion” largely outnumbers the plural “religions”, turning it into a single unified policy object without breaking down its spiritual diversity and complexity. Subsequently, the mention of denominations is present but secondary, even if Islam is constantly the underlying topic. The religious dimension is frequently addressed as an adjective (“religious”), a component of another larger problem (ex: religious civil society) rather than as an autonomous variable. In this issue-based approach, religious freedom/freedom of religion occupies most of the semantic space. The prevalence of a legal vocabulary confirms that human rights are the mandatory and often only prism through which to consider religion and values. Belief is more important than practice in the conception of religion framing the approach of European institutions. This conception is sometimes criticised for being too Western, Christian-centric and out-of-tune with secularizing societies that keep religion as ritual provider and memory rather than normative doctrine. The self-referentiality of institutional discourse is reflected by the multiples references to political and religious organizations that are the main actors of European politics while religion is increasingly de-institutionalized in European societies. The geography-based approach of religion with a focus on Middle-East reflects another usual tendency of the EU to circumscribe it to specific regions of the world.

3.3 The uses of values

“Value” is given a constitutive role by the discourse of European institutions about religion. It is a founding element, “base”, “root”, “cornerstone”, “soul”, “heart” and “heritage” for the EU. It has also a dynamic function to “shape”, “to bind” together
and “to equip” a European community in-the-making. Acting on or through “value” is both presented in offensive and defensive senses. Values are mostly to “promote”, a peaceful and positive quest for influence. On the same line, they may be a tool to “raise awareness” or “strengthen”. With a lesser but quite significant frequency, “value” is also something to “defend” (a leitmotiv), to “respect” or “safeguard”. The existence of a threat or of an unstable surrounding setting or a challenge may be mentioned without more precision. Acting on/through values is enunciated as a necessity and a need rather than a choice.

About the ownership of value, there is no clear evidence neither of one that would be promoted exclusively by a specific institution nor of an institution privileging one among the others. Freedom is the common motto. Ownership refers also to geography and political accountability. Value is most of the times presented as “European”, but also often “universal”, a sign that the EU is not a hermetic political and normative container.

4. ZOOMING IN ON A PIVOTAL VALUE: THE RULE OF LAW

4.1 Context and actors

Over the last decades international and European organizations have put the rule of law at the centre of their prescriptions for economic, political and social reforms. The EU’s focus on the rule of law – as a common value and as a tool to promote democracy – goes back to the beginning of the 1990s when EU institutional actors endeavoured not only to democratize EU”s institutional framework, but also to assess its role in the world. In this context, it has been argued that the legitimacy of the EU as a “normative power” seems to rest upon its ability to translate – via its own process of justification ad application – universal norms into more concrete policies” (Bickerton 2011: 35). Being both one of the values on which the EU is founded and an objective of EU foreign policy, the rule of law has been invoked as a “mean” and as an “end” to develop and legitimate a wide range of internal and external policies. The internal and external dimensions are highly dependent and linked to each other, as EU”s meaning of the rule of law was developed and enriched by means of its external promotion. The Lisbon Treaty brought European values to a new level with extension of Article 2 of the TEU aimed to develop a European identity and enhance EU
legitimacy, where the rule of law is of particular importance.

The rule of law entered the realm of EU policy by the “back door”, as a policy benchmark used initially in the external action of the EU to assess the candidate countries” commitment to democracy and as a form of technical assistance. By guiding domestic reforms in the former communist countries, the European Commission has acquired expertise and knowledge in a series of policy fields that were formerly outside the area of competence of the EU (Coman 2015). In only a couple of years, the institution managed to develop its new enlargement policy and to define its approach to promoting the rule of law. The enlargement process has contributed to the technicization of the debate on the rule of law. However, in recent years the rule of law has become a matter of concern within the EU giving rise to heightened tensions between domestic and European actors. The politicization of the rule of law in the context of the revision of the Hungarian constitution in 2011 was a window of opportunity for the European Commission to clarify its power vis-à-vis the Member States. However, the attempts of Commissioner Redding and of the EP to politicize the issue have been blocked by several heads of states and government. In spite of their different conceptions on how to safeguard the rule of law at the supranational level, EU institutional actors are committed to “promote”, “strengthen”, and “defend” the rule of law.

Therefore, both in its internal and external action, the European Commission uses the rule of law to define political priorities and as a result, politicize it and gives it new meanings depending on the political context. Among all documents analysed from EU institutions, only coordinative discourses of the Council of the EU are providing clear guidelines and maps for other EU actors on how to promote and safeguard the rule of law. It is also worth noticing that all European institutions are referring to the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe in their discourses as the most important monitoring expert in the field of rule of law enhancement. Thus, when dealing with rule of law as one of its core objective and founding value, the EU defers to an external authority.

This section illustrates how the EU reacted simultaneously to a series of threats to the rule of law internally and externally and how these two dimensions affect each other. The empirical analysis is supported by a wide range of documents from 2000 to 2015 including communications of the European Commission, speeches on the rule of law
addressed by members of the college of commissioners, conclusions of the Council, parliamentary debates, resolutions of the EP and reports produced by Members of the EP on the respect of fundamental values by EU member states. Our set of data contains 65 official and non-official documents originating from the European Commission, the EP and the Council of the EU. Drawing on this set of data, the aim was to explore when, how and why the EU refers to the rule of law as a common value.

4.2 Salience and uses of the rule of law – internal dimension

To scrutinise the salience of the rule of law, we have selected those documents in which EU institutional actors explicitly made reference to this principle. From a quantitative perspective, we have sought to see the word frequency in the coordinative and communicative discourses of EU institutional actors and their variation over time. From a qualitative perspective, the aim was to examine the evolution of the coordinative and communicative discourses dealing with the rule of law, from the end of the “Austrian case” (i.e. the parliamentary elections in Austria in 1999 and the formation of the Austrian government with the support of the far right populist party, the FPÖ) and the beginning of the Hungarian “East-side story” (i.e. the constitutional and judicial reforms undertaken by Prime Minister Victor Orban, since 2011).

The salience of the rule of law as a “common value” in the coordinative and communicative discourses of EU institutional actors during the period under consideration is high. The rule of law was one of the most prevalent syntagmas used in the communications of the Commissions in 2003 (after the debates about the legislative elections in Austria) and in 2014 (when the European Commission had been invited by EU Member States to identify how to safeguard the rule of law at the supranational level). We observe however that the discourse of the Commission on how to safeguard this principle has changed and that the initial ambitions have been lowered. The qualitative analysis reveals that in the discourse of the Commission, the rule of law is often invoked to institutionalize new policies and that it gives matter to power games among institutions.

The rule of law is also present in the documents of the Council, particularly since the

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4 There has been analyzed 35 discourse of the corpus. Based on V. Schmidt classification the discourses were classified as following: 9 coordinative (Communication of the Commission, documents of the Council) and 26 communicative discourses (Speeches, debates and resolutions).
issue of the violation of this value by EU Member States has been raised at the European level. Content analysis reveals different logics and aims in the institutional discourse of the actors. While the recent discourse of the European Commission focuses on the need to strengthen the rule of law at the supranational level, member states’ rhetoric is linked to the idea of “sovereignty”, “political dialogue”, “non-discrimination”, “equal treatment among member states”, “respect of national identities”, “compliance with the fundamental values”.

The comparison of the coordinative and communicative discourses illustrates that EU institutional actors tend to focus on “what to do” (i.e. the instrumental dimension) rather than “why” (i.e. the raison d’être of the EU). The European Commission, the EP and the Council have the tendency to expand on the cognitive dimension of ideas (what the situation is and what should be done about it) and to focus less on the normative dimension (what is good and what is bad).

4.3 Salience and uses of the rule of law – the external dimension

To examine how the rule of law is framed in the external action of the European Union, our analysis draws on a set of documents produced by the European Commission (DG Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, DG Justice with a particular focus on speeches by Commissioners and by the President of the European Commission regarding foreign policies and the rule of law), by the Council of the EU and by the EP’s Committees on Foreign Affairs, Civil Liberties Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) and Petitions (PETI).

Regarding the evolution over the mobilization of the rule of law over time, three periods can be distinguished: 2000-2005, 2005-2010 and 2010-2015. These periods correspond approximately to new mandates within the European Commission. Accordingly, each new Commissioner or President introduced new instrumental ideas regarding the rule of law. References to the rule of law have been made to develop the enlargement policy and to strengthen the capacity action of the European Commission. The rule of law has been also put at the centre in order to legitimize the establishment of the European Neighbourhood Policy and its revision.

The first period of 2000-2005 was fully concentrated on the forthcoming 2004 enlargement. Solidarity was the pivotal value, while the rule of law associated with this fundamental value gained a meaning of “mutual trust” aimed to enhance rule of law
cooperation and encourage old member states to share best practices with accessing member states.

The second period of 2005-2010 was rather controversial for European values, including the rule of law, due to the “crisis of European institutions” mentioned in the discourses of Commissioners. As the European Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security Franco Frattini said: “Many values and achievements are being doubted”. Therefore, the rule of law became more present in discourses as a tool to overcome the crisis and restore faith in the European project. Meanwhile, internal security as part of a bigger rule of law initiative was placed at the top of the political agenda with a focus on the creation of common area of Security, Justice and Home Affairs in the enlarged EU. As a result the rule of law got more "judicial" usage and was associated with “independent and impartial judiciary”.

The third period of 2010-2015 corresponds to the “Enlargement fatigue” and increasing doubts regarding the EU”s achievements. In order to regain public trust, the EU put forward the rule of law as an evidence of EU”s efficiency and “credibility” in the enlargement process and in the democratization of new and prospective EU member states. Accordingly, the rule of law was put at the heart of the EU enlargement and external policies with a new approach to the rule of law and New Enlargement Strategy (Chapters 23 and 24 opened first).

Another period opened when a new Commission took office at the end of 2014. Fresh driving stimuli have been the terroristic attacks on European soil and the migration crisis. These events have been framed as direct threats against EU founding values, calling for a reassertion of rule of law.

This analysis reveals thus that the rule of law is an evolutional pattern which underwent deep changes during each new enlargement and was used as a political tool for the legitimation of new policies.

**CONCLUSIONS**

This exploration of EU institutional discourses in some highly normatively-loaded policy sectors leads to preliminary observations on the causes and modalities of the
emergence of values in European politics. First, it appears that the overall salience of values is weak. This is not surprising if we consider the limited legal competencies and symbolic and moral resources of the EU in normative matters. It is necessary to explore further the possible discrepancy between their discretion in institutional discourses and more frequent occurrences of European values in public discourses coming from politicians, media or civil society.

Values are particularly summoned in moments of crises and important challenges: reform of the Treaty, enlargement, increasing migratory flows, terrorist attacks, economic and geopolitical hardships. The EU institutions are in no position to establish and impose a homogenous consensual system of values. Being elusive concepts underpinning a wide range of definitions and meanings, values can be mobilized to legitimise all sorts of actions. They are not an end in themselves but a way to define the European polity and to justify its policies.

Regarding their vagueness and polysemy, values as invoked in EU institutional discourse are deemed to suffer from a number of contradictions and uncertainties. A fundamental tension appears: values are a keystone of the EU’s identity. As such, they are conceived as self-evident and naturalized, so self-evident in fact, that there is no need to define them. Unless this naturalization is a device to hide a void: the institutional incapacity to substantiate values.

In order to link these results to broader questions of the ValEUR project, we can observe the cautious EU institutions’ attempt to govern through values, mobilizing them to assert the European political order, its processes of policy-making and outcomes and to contain dissent. But the openness and flexibility of European values that are not circumscribed by a strong political discourse also leave the door open for alternative versions and contestations. It may be exaggerated to say that the EU is governed by values since no homogenous political force is contesting frontally Brussels and able to enforce an alternative normative framework. Still, the EU has been increasingly challenged in “its raison d’être” (the achievement of its founding values, precisely); its purpose (refusal of “an ever closer union”); its policies (for example austerity); and even its very existence or at least the belonging to it (Grexit, Brexit). More than ever, it remains exposed to resistances and contestations in internal politics, and to misunderstandings and attribution of undesired identities by third parties in external affairs.
European values are described as “founding”, “shared”, “common”. The most salient are: democracy, freedom, human rights, rule of law, quite logically those enshrined in the founding treaties. These values are mostly framed using legal terminology. Still, they are also associated with an ethno-cultural approach to identity and citizenship. These values are consubstantial with Europe and draw the boundaries of “Europeanness”, and hence create otherness. In the official documents, values belong most of time to Europe or the EU, the two being interchangeable. Against this background, applying for membership to the EU may acquire a civilizational dimension, and compliance with constitutive values is required. Nevertheless, the very same values can be described as Western, universal, global. They are supposed to found a European identity and belong to everyone. This may be seen as a contradiction. Or it may refer to an underlying re-ordering. Democratic values may have a universal range, but Europe is their navel, their best interpreter and their most perfect expression.

Another uncertainty surrounding these values is whether they can be subject to change or compromise. Indeed, while taken for granted, values are sometimes presented as potentially changing. In several occasions, documents propose an “exchange of values” or debates and reflections on values. When the EU programmes on citizenship or guidelines on communication or religion propose to foster dialogues within the civil society to discuss values, we leave the dimension of “Governing through values” to enter the one of “Governing values”. In this case, the EU ambitions to create the spaces in which values can be debated and hence revised, expanded or redefined – within the EU but also with third, neighbouring or candidate countries. Crucial questions are then: What is the actual balance, in practice, between “core” and “founding” values which are a non-negotiable given, and “other”, “alternative” values? To what extent can values be contested, debated and altered? And finally, if such room for debate exists, who is allowed to partake in and contribute to the reflection on values? Looking at the broader picture, a hypothesis is that the EU may be keen to debate about values when choices to be made are risky, when no consensus emerges and when experts fail to deliver the “one best way”. In this case, openness would come from incertitude. These are some of the questions that the project ValEUR intends to explore.
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APPENDIX 1: LIST OF DOCUMENTS

1. Corpus Communication

Erkki Liikanen, “eEurope: The Way Forward”, Ministerial meeting, Lisbon, 10 April 2000, (Member of the European Commission responsible for Enterprise and the Information Society) Speech/00/130


Viviane Reding, “Advertising as the cornerstone of a strong European media landscape”, Annual Congress of the Swiss Press, St Moritz, 15 September 2006, Speech/06/506.


Viviane Reding, “The need for convivencia: European values and non-discrimination at the heart of Europe”s Roma strategy”, Second European Roma Summit, Córdoba, 8 April 2010, Speech/10/147.


European Commission, “EU Cybersecurity plan to protect open internet and online freedom and opportunity”, press release, Brussels, 7 February 2013, IP/13/94.


European Parliament, “Communicating “Europe” to its citizens: state of affairs and prospects”, Executive summary, November 2014,

Committee of the Regions, Christophe Rouillon (Rapporteur), mayor of Coulaines, “Reconnecting Europe with its citizens - more and better communication at local level”, Draft Opinion, 109th plenary session of the Committee of the Regions, 3-4 December 2014.

2. Corpus Memory, Citizenship, Culture, Education

Documents on memory:

European Parliament, “The future of Europe 60 years after the Second World War” Resolution on the 60th anniversary of the end of the Second World War in Europe on 8 May 1945, P6_TA(2005)0180


Declaration of the European Parliament on the Proclamation of 23 August as European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism (2010/C 8 E/10)


European Parliament Resolution on the Centennial of the Armenian Genocide (2015/C 315/05)

Documents on citizenship:

Council Decision establishing for the period 2007-2013 the specific programme “Fundamental rights and citizenship” as part of the General programme “Fundamental Rights and Justice” 2005/0037 (COD)

Decision No 1904/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing for the period 2007-2013 the programme “Citizens for Europe” to promote active European citizenship


European Parliament Resolution of 24 March 2009 on active dialogue with citizens on Europe (2010/C 117 E/05)


Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the
implementation, results and overall assessment of the 2013 European Year of Citizens COM(2014) 687 final

**Documents on culture:**

Decision No 1419/1999/EC establishing a Community action for the European Capital of Culture event for the years 2005 to 2019


European Parliament resolution of 10 April 2008 on a European agenda for culture in a globalising world (2007/2211(INI))

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “European agenda for culture in a globalizing world”, COM(2007) 242 final


Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the
implementation of the European agenda for culture, COM(2010)390


Decision No 445/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 establishing a Union action for the European Capitals of Culture for the years 2020 to 2033 and repealing Decision No 1622/2006/EC

Documents on education:


Final report from the Commission on the implementation of the Socrates programme 1995-1999, COM(2001) 75 final


Resolution of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council, on the recognition of the value of non-
formal and informal learning within the European youth field (2006/C 168/01)

Decision No 1298/2008/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 establishing the Erasmus Mundus 2009-2013 action programme for the enhancement of quality in higher education and the promotion of intercultural understanding through cooperation with third countries


Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “Erasmus for all”: the EU Programme for Education, Training, Youth and Sport, COM(2011) 787 final

Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing “Erasmus for all”: the Union Programme for Education, Training, Youth and Sport, 2011/0371 (COD)


European Union Education Ministers, Declaration on Promoting citizenship and the common values of freedom, tolerance and non-discrimination through education, Paris, 17 March 2015

3. Corpus Religion

Discourses by presidents of the European Commission in meetings with religious and philosophic communities (archived on line since 2005 with a strong irregularity, intensification since 2009\(^5\), documents in English except when available only in French

\(^5\) High-level meetings and working level discussions are held regularly between the European Commission and philosophical and non-confessional organisations, as well as with churches and religious associations and communities. The dialogue is now under the responsibility of First Vice-President Timmermans. Today”s high level meeting with representatives of philosophical and non-confessional organisation is the sixth in
and in some other related events.


Romano Prodi, Speech without title, Plenary Assembly Of the European Conference Of Chief Rabbis, Brussels, 6 May 2002, SPEECH/02/98,

José Manuel Durão Barroso, “Talking Against terror: the role of churches and religions in Europe”, Meeting with religious leaders, Brussels, 12 July 2005


José Manuel Durão Barroso, “Droits de l’homme: le point de convergence de tous les héritages européens”, Colloque de la Fédération humaniste européenne, Bruxelles, 16 avril 2008


José Manuel Durão Barroso, Discourse without title, Meeting of President Barroso with leading dignitaries of the three monotheistic religions and the presidents of the European Council and the European Parliament, Brussels, 11/5/2009

José Manuel Durão Barroso, “A Europe of values”, International Meeting for Peace, the series of meetings launched by the Commission in 2009 when the dialogue with churches, religions, philosophical and non-confessional organisations was enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty.

José Manuel Durão Barroso, “European values in the new global governance”, Opening of the Brussels office of the European Jewish Congress, Brussels, 14 October 2009, SPEECH/09/470

José Manuel Durão Barroso, “Remarks by President Barroso at the 10th High Level meeting of religious leaders”, Press conference, Brussels, 10 June 2014, SPEECH/14/446

José Manuel Durão Barroso, “President Barroso meets Frère Alois, Prior of the Taizé Community”, European Meeting of Young Adults in Brussels, (Ecumenical Community of Taizé), Brussels, 15/12/2015

Official documents and reports


European Commission, Guidelines on the implementation of Article 17, July 2013

Council of the European Union, “EU Guidelines on the promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief”, Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg, 24 June 2013

Press releases by the European Commission, mostly following meetings with communities of faith and conviction

IP/05/904, Brussels, 12 July 2005, “José Manuel Barroso meets European religious leaders”

IP/07/670, Brussels, 15 May 2007, “The President of the European Parliament, the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission meet faith leaders to discuss human dignity”

IP/09/1046, Brussels, 26 June 2009, “Presidents of Commission and Parliament meet European philosophical non-confessional organisations”

IP/14/650, Brussels, 10 June 2014, “The Commission, the Council and the Parliament debate the future of the European Union with religious leaders”

IP/15/5179, Brussels, 16 June 2015, “Commission brings together religious leaders to discuss “Living together and disagreeing well””

4. Corpus rule of law

Internal dimension

The European Commission

The Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Article 7 of the Treaty on the European Union entitled “Respect for and promotion of the values on which the EU in based (COM (2003)606 final)


European Commission, “The European Commission Reiterates its Serious Concerns Over the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of Hungary”, 12 April 2013.


**The European Parliament**


European Parliament, “Respect for and promotion of the values on which the Union is based European Parliament. Legislative resolution on the Commission communication on Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union: Respect for and promotion of the values on which the Union is based” (COM(2003) 606 – C5-0594/2003 – 2003/2249(INI)).


European Parliament, Resolution of 10 June 2015 on the situation in Hungary (2015/2700(RSP)).
The Council of the European Union

Letter to the President of the Commission from Four Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 6 March 2013.


Council of the European Union, Conclusions of the Council of the European Union and the member states meeting within the Council on ensuring respect for the rule of law, 16 December 2014.

Council of the European Union, Conclusions of the Council of the EU and the Member States meeting within the Council on ensuring respect for the rule of law, 17014/14, 14 December 2014.

External dimension

Reports of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission)

Report « The Rule of Law in European Jurisprudence » by Martin Loughlin, 29 May 2009

Report on the Rule of Law adopted at 86th plenary session of the Venice Commission on the basis of comments by Pieter van Dijk, Gret Haller, Jeffrey Jowell, Kaarlo Tuori, 26 March 2011

Reports from the Conference “The Rule of Law as practical concept”, 2 March 201
Report “State of Democracy, Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Europe” by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, 2014

European Commissioners’ Speeches


Romano Prodi, “Europe and the Rule of Law”, 2 December 2000

Romano Prodi, “Rich Diversity: Union’s Strength”, 9 November 2001

Romano Prodi, “The European Project in the World: between values and politics” 13 June 2003


Franco Frattini, “The Rule of Law and Independent Judiciary as a condition for EU accession”, 25 April 2006

José Manuel Durão Barroso, “European values in the new global governance”, 14 October 2009


Věra Jourová, Speech at the Informal JHA council in Riga, 30 January 2015

Frans Timmermans, “EU framework for democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights” by First Vice President of the European Commission, 12 February 2015

European Parliament
Resolution on the evaluation of justice in relation to criminal justice and the rule of law, 12 March 2003

Opinion of the Committee on Regional Development for the Committee on Foreign Affairs on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument, 24 April 2012

Opinion of the Committee on Petitions for the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union (2010-2011), 12 June 2012

Briefing on Member States and the Rule of Law. Dealing with breach of values, March 2015
Resolution of 10 June 2015 on the situation in Hungary

Resolution of 10 June 2015 on the state of EU-Russia relations

Follow-up to the European Parliament Resolution on evaluation of justice in relation to criminal justice and the rule of law, adopted by the Commission on 25 June 2015


Council of the European Union

EU Concept for CSDP Missions (within the Rule of Law framework), 20 December 2010

Report of the 4th Annual Symposium of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Promoting the rule of law in the EU”, 7 June 2013

Opinion on Commission's Communication on a new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law: compatibility with the Treaty, 27 May 2014

Communication on Ensuring Respect for the Rule of Law, 12 December 2014
ANNEX 2: STATISTICS AND VISUALIZATIONS

1. Global corpus
The term “values” represents 0.15% of the words used in the corpus (words of minimum 5 letters).

Word cloud of the 500 most salient words in the global corpus. “Values” appears on the margin of the cloud (down part)

2. Corpus Communication

Salience of the term “values”: 0.15%.
Word cloud of the 500 most salient words in this corpus.

3. Corpus Memory, Citizenship, Culture, Education
Salience of the term “values”: 0.09%.

Word cloud of the 500 most salient words in this corpus.

4. Corpus Religion
Salience of “values”: 0.22%.

Word cloud of the 500 more salient words in the corpus.
5. Corpus Rule of Law

Internal dimension

Figure 1: Cloud representing the most prevalent words used in the 2003 Commission’s Communication

Figure 2: Cloud representing the most prevalent words used in the 2014 Commission’s Communication

Change in the discourse of the Commission is also reflected by the quantitative analysis of the documents. In 2003, the most prevalent words in the Communication of the Commission were “European”, “values” and “common”, which corresponded to respectively 4.59%, 3.21% and 2.75% in the whole text. In 2014 the word Rule of Law was used 91 times, having the highest percentage in terms of occurrences (3.32%). Only 12 references were made to values, representing only 0.44% in the whole document.
The quantitative analysis of the documents allows illustrating change in the substantive content of ideas. For example, the word "Council" is the most prevalent expression used in the total number of documents issued by this institution (378 occurrences, representing 2,98%). The Parliament is mentioned 10 times (0,20%) while the word "Commission" is used 92 times (0,72%). The quantitative analysis reflects the intergovernmental rhetoric, illustrated by the prevalence of expressions such as "protection" (0,45%), "cooperation" (0,43%), and "dialogue" (0,41%). This result is confirmed by the individual analysis of each document. For example, the 3 most prevalent words used in the Council conclusions from 2014 were: "Council" (4,73%), "rule" (2,70%) and "dialogue" (2,36%). As a general remark, looking at the entire set of documents produced by the Council, it appears that the word “values” has only 22 occurrences lagging being the terms “law” (93 occurrences, 0,73%) and “rule” (67 occurrences, 0,53%).
External dimension

Salience of “values”: 0,19%.